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INTRODUCTION
Various security requirements are coming up with the sharply increased diversity and complexity of the computing environments (Rushby, 1992; Saltzer, 1973) . To satisfy these security requirements, a variety of security models were proposed in last twenty years. Currently widely-used security models include multilevel security model (BLP -Bell, 1975) and its variants (Biba, 1977) , Dion model (Dion, 1981) , Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) (Walker, 1996; Badger, 1995) , RBAC (Sandhu, 1996; Sandhu, 1997) , and etc. Each of these models aims mainly at one or few security require-ments, such as BLP aiming at the confidentiality assurance, Biba aiming at integrity assurance, DTE aiming at confining the information flow channels (Rushby, 1992) .
Previous operating system usually enforced only one kind of access control model, for instance, Multics (Organick, 1972) implemented only BLP model in it. However, as mentioned above, * the security goals in different applications are various. These different security requirements result in different security models needed for them. How operating system to support this kind of multiple security model views needs?
As a policy neutral security model, RBAC provides a valuable level of permission abstraction. However, using RBAC to simulate MLS or DAC models (Osborn, 2000) is over complex and therefore unpractical in real-world operating system. *This research is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 60473093.
The Multi-Model Views Security Framework (MMVSF) is proposed. Several access control models are embodied in MMVSF, including BLP, Biba, DTE and RBAC. These classical models can be easily enforced in MMVSF to implement multiple access control model views in system.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 formally describes the MMVSF. Section 3 gives the examples of enforcing multiple access control model views. And section 4 is the conclusion.
MMVSF

The Framework Overview
The architecture of the MMVSF is shown in figure 1 . MMVSF comprises of elements, relations and mappings. A user in the framework is a system user. A role is a job function or job title within some associated authority. Subjects are active entities. Objects are resource objects. Domain is a control access attribute associated with each subject. And type is the other control attribute associated with objects. Permission is an approval of a particular mode of access to object or interaction to subject. Security label contains a confidentiality label and an integrity label. There are several relations and mappings between elements. user-role assignment relation, user-subject relation, and subject-role mapping figure out the relations between users, roles and subjects. Permissions in system can be authorized to roles, which are given in role-permission authorization relation. Role-domain authorization relation gives the authorized domains of each role. Each subject has only one running domain, which is given in subject-domain mapping. Besides, each role has a security label, and subject's security label is determined by its running role. Each object has a type and security label.
The Final Permissions the subject gets are based on three kinds of permissions corresponding to that subject: MLS Permissions, Domain Permissions, Role Permissions. Definition 2.9 Multilevel Security rule: Mls_rule: SL×SL→2 M , a∈Mls_rule(l 1 , l 2 ) implies subjects with security label l 1 can access target objects or subjects with security label l 2 in mode a. All of BLP and Biba security rules are implemented in this mapping. As a framework, the concrete implementing of this function is not given here. ,o)∩tp(s,o) ).
Formal Definitions
Permissions
ENFORCE MULTIPLE MODELS
Enforcing Multilevel Security Model
The way configuring MMVSF to enforce BLP model is described as following:
(1) I={only_I}, there is only one integrity label in system. |R|=|SL|, number of roles in the system is the same as the number of the security labels. Each role corresponds to one security label. (2) D={gen_d}, T={gen_t}, only one domain and type in system. RD={(r, gen_d)|r∈R}, all roles' authorized domain is gen_d. all objects' type is gen_t:
gen_d have all Domain Permissions to type gen_t. (4) Rolecap(r:R)=Φ, each role has no Role Permissions. We can use the similar way to enforce Biba model.
Enforcing DTE
(1) R={gen_r}, one role in system. UA={ (u, gen_r) 
Enforcing Multi-model Views
Assume all users in system can be divided into three groups: Grpa, Grpb and Grpc. Now we hope that the model enforced on users in Grpa is MLS, on Grpb is RBAC and on Grpc is DTE. The configuration that enforces this multi-model views in one system is given below.
(1) U=Grpa∪Grpb∪Grpc, three disjointed subsets.
(2) R=mls_rs∪rbac_rs∪{dte_r}. mts_rs is the roles set corresponding to MLS model. rbac_rs corresponding to RBAC and dte_r to DTE. (3) D= {mls_d}∪{rbac_d}∪dte_ds.
(4) (u,r) ∈ UA ∈ (u,r') ∉ UA, where u ∈ Grpa, r∈ mls_rs, r'∉mls_rs, roles in mls_rs are only permitted to be assigned to users in Grpa. (u, r) ∈ UA∈ (u,r') ∉UA, where u∈Grpb, r∈ rbac_rs, r'∉rbac_rs, roles in rbac_rs can only be assigned to users in Grpb. In the same way, (u, 
CONCLUSION
The MMVSF security framework provides a way to easily enforce multiple access control models in an operating system to satisfy the diverse security requirements in one system.
